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Introduction 
This thesis explores Plato’s dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro. The Meno ponders 
on the question “What is virtue?”, the Euthyphro “What is piety?” The dialogues Laches 
(“What is courage?”), Hippias Major (“What is the fine?”) and Charmides (“What is 
temperance?”) follow a similar pattern. This is commonly formalised as Socrates asking 
the “What is F?” question (see Fine 2004: 46-47) or alternatively the “What is F-ness?” 
question (Benson 1992: 123) or the “What is the F?” question (Benson 1992: 134). Which 
one to use is a matter of preference. I will use “What is the F?” because as we will see, 
Socrates asks for the one “form itself” (Euth. 6d)1, and to me, “What is F?” does not seem 
to capture this, while “What is F-ness?” perhaps too strongly hints at essence. In any case, 
all these dialogues end in aporia, that is, for one reason or another, no satisfactory answer 
is found. Socrates’ interlocutors offer several answers, but each is refuted. Socrates often 
seems to be especially unhappy with the first answer given to his “What is the F?” 
question. Often scholars characterise the first answers (but not necessarily only the first 
answers) as giving examples (e.g., Geach 1966: 371). Although I do not object to this 
characterisation, I will often talk of lists instead. I prefer to talk of lists or sets rather than 
examples because Socrates’ criticism seems to be aimed at there being (explicitly named, 
or implicitly thought) more than one candidate for the F, and because the word ‘example’ 
does not capture this multitude-ness as well as the word ‘list’. I am, then, interested in 
why Socrates2 finds unsatisfactory the answers where the interlocutors name just one or 
more F things, that is, where they give examples as part of a list (a set of candidates for 
the F). For instance, Meno’s third answer to the question “What is virtue?” is: “I think 
courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others” 
(74a).  
The reason for my focusing on the Meno and the Euthyphro is that in these dialogues we 
find the clearest cases of the interlocutor giving a list. In chapter I, then, I hope to show 
that the first answer in the Euthyphro, and the first and third answer in the Meno do 
                                                            
1 I will use the Stephanus pagination to refer to Plato’s works. All quotes from the Euthyphro and the Meno 
are from G.M.A Grube’s translation, unless noted otherwise. 
2 I do not make claims about the historical Socrates. I consider the positions of the character Socrates in the 
dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro. 
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indeed provide a list. I refer to these answers as the Three Answers. In the case of the 
Meno, the fact that we are dealing with lists should not be too uncontroversial, but we will 
see that in the Euthyphro, it is already not immediately obvious.  
I use some anachronistic terms, that is, terms which were not used by Plato or Socrates 
themselves. It was Aristotle who started to analyse Plato in terms of universals (katholou), 
but the word is not found in the dialogues themselves (Fine 2004: 46). In chapter II, I 
nevertheless consider an interpretation which claims that these answers are discarded by 
Socrates because they provide particulars instead of universals.  Following Alexander 
Nehamas (1999: 159-175) and Hugh H. Benson (1992: 123-128), I show why this 
interpretation is not correct.  
In chapter III, I look at the interpretation of P. T. Geach (1966: 369-382). Nehamas (1999: 
160-161) lumps Geach’s position together with the particulars vs. universals 
interpretation. For reasons that I will outline, I am not convinced that this is a fair 
characterisation, and in any case, Geach has a further point. He claims that Socrates 
commits a fallacy, and Geach  calls this the Socratic fallacy (Geach 1966: 371). I will give 
an overview of what this supposed fallacy consists of, how it is supposed to explain why 
Socrates rejects examples, and attempt to show that no such fallacy is actually made by 
Socrates. 
In chapter IV, I look at the position of Nehamas (1999: 159-175), which is that Euthyphro, 
specifically, is either forced to admit that his definition is too narrow, or that his definition 
of F fails to give a single explanation – contrary to his earlier admission that there should 
be just one explanation. I will also look at whether this is what is going on in the Meno. I 
will claim, contra Nehamas, that Socrates does not make a narrowness-criticism against 
any of the Three Answers. But I agree with the second part of Nehamas’ position. In 
conclusion, I will claim that Socrates assumes that there is only one explanation (form) 
for why all F things are F, and that Socrates thinks the Three Answers provide more than 
one explanation, and that this is why he rejects the answers. 
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I. An Overview of the Three Answers 
In this chapter, I will give a brief overview of the first and third answers in the Meno, and 
the first answer in the Euthyphro. I try to show that in each case, Socrates finds fault with 
answers which explicitly or implicitly give a list (a list, if you will, consisting of examples), 
and that each time, Socrates makes the same complaint. In the remainder of this thesis, I 
will try to find out what this complaint means and why Socrates rejects these answers. 
In the Meno, Meno asks from Socrates whether virtue (ἀρετή) can be taught. Socrates, 
however, not only claims not to know whether virtue can be taught or not, but also not to 
know what other qualities virtue might have or not have, and that this is so because he 
does not know what virtue itself is. He asks Meno to explain it to him: “But Meno, by the 
gods, what do you yourself say that virtue is?” (71d).  
In reply, Meno evidently provides an incomplete set of virtues:  
M: First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue consists 
of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm 
his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue 
of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve 
its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether 
male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, 
or if you want that of a free man or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, 
so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and 
every age, for every task of ours and every one of us – and Socrates, the same is true 
for wickedness. (71d-72a) 
So, there are different virtues for different kinds of persons, actions, etc. But Socrates 
sarcastically objects: “I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, 
I have found you to have a whole swarm of them“ (72a). Meno’s answer seems to literally 
name too many things (that is, it provides a list, or a set), while what was asked for was 
just one thing3. I will simply call this the “Too Many Criticism”. 
                                                            
3 I will follow David Sedley (1998: 115) in using the word ‘thing’ extremely liberally. It is a placeholder to 
refer to particulars, universals, etc., that is, to whatever is presented as a candidate for the F. See also my 
footnote [13]. 
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Meno’s second attempt at an answer, which we will not consider by itself, but which we 
will shortly see to lead to the third answer, is that virtue is to be able to rule over men. 
Socrates asks whether they should add to to be able to rule over men that it should be 
done justly (73d). Meno thinks so, for (so he says), “justice is virtue” (73d). Socrates 
wonders whether justice is virtue or a virtue, and when Meno does not understand what 
he means, Socrates explains by analogy, saying that, for example, roundness is only a 
shape, not shape, because there are shapes other than roundness (73e). Meno then 
corrects himself: “So I too say that not only justice is a virtue but there are many other 
virtues…[] I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and 
very many others” (73e-74a). (To those unaware like myself, the unexpected virtue of 
munificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια) is the same as being generous). I will consider this to be 
Meno’s third answer. Socrates says that they are “…having the same trouble again, Meno, 
though in another way; we have found many virtues while looking for one, but we cannot 
find the one which covers all the others” (74a).  
Again we explicitly have an incomplete set, or a list, and Socrates offers the Too Many 
Criticism (“…we have found many virtues while looking for one…”). 
Something similar happens in the Euthyphro, though in a less obvious way. In this 
dialogue, Socrates runs into Euthyphro in front of the court. Socrates is heading to a court 
hearing, eventually leading to his fatal trial which is depicted in the Apology. Euthyphro, 
in contrast, is not going to court in order to defend himself from prosecution, but will 
rather be the one doing the prosecuting – infamously, he is accusing his own father for 
the murder of a hired worker. Euthyphro finds this to be the pious thing to do, since (or 
so he believes) it does not matter whether a killer is unknown to you or your closest 
relative indeed: an injustice must be brought to court (2a-4e).  
This leads Socrates to examine where this confidence of Euthyphro stems from; he must 
surely be an exceptionally knowledgeable man (and Euthyphro happily agrees to this) in 
matters of piety and impiety to dare undertake such a controversial thing as prosecuting 
one’s own father (4e-5a). 
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With that in mind, Socrates insists that Euthyphro let him, too, know what is piety (τὸ 
ὅσιον)4. 
S: So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what 
kind of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards 
murder and other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and 
the impious the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to 
be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it is impious? 
E: Most certainly, Socrates. 
S: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say? (5c-d) 
This is Euthyphro’s answer: 
E: I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, 
be it about murder or temple robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is 
your father or your mother or anyone else; not to prosecute is impious. (5d-e) 
At first sight, Euthyphro does not seem to be giving a list as an answer. He is saying that 
the pious is “to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer”, and that this 
(prosecuting the wrongdoer) applies to various different offences, and this irrespective of 
who committed the offence. But consider Socrates’ answer: 
S: …try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, for, my friend, you did 
not teach me adequately when I asked you what the pious was, but you told me that 
what you are doing now, prosecuting your father for murder, is pious. 
E: And I told the truth, Socrates. 
S: Perhaps. You agree, however, that there are many other pious actions.  
E: There are. 
S: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious 
actions but that form [εἶδος] itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed 
that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form 
[ἰδέα], or don’t you remember?  
                                                            
4 G.M.A Grube, whose text I cite, translates τὸ ὅσιον as “the pious”, while John Burnet, whom we will discuss 
in chapter II, translates it as “holy”. 
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E: I do. 
S: Tell me then what this form [ἰδέα]5 itself is, so that I may look upon it, and using 
it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, 
and if it is not that it is not. (6c-e) 
We will later return to the claim that pious actions are pious through one form. For now, 
note that Socrates has to ask for confirmation that Euthyphro thinks there are other (yet 
unnamed) pious actions (or types of pious actions)6, and that Euthyphro confirms there 
are. The point is that theoretically, he could have denied this, and then his answer would 
not have provided (part of) a list and instead the one (kind of) thing which was actually 
named would have been a candidate for just what piety is. But with the confirmation, 
Socrates is in a position to complain that he did not want to know “one or two of the many 
pious actions” (compare with the unwanted onslaught of the “swarm” of virtues in Meno’s 
first answer, and the “many” virtues in Meno’s third answer), but only one thing (the form 
itself). Clearly Socrates again provides the Too Many Criticism. With this in mind, I 
suggest that we characterise Euthyphro’s answer as implicitly giving a list, despite this 
not being clear from his answer alone. His confirmed intent is to partially enumerate 
members (examples) of a list of pious actions (or types of pious actions), with the “many” 
other members simply being unnamed. Alternatively, we could say that Euthyphro lacks 
commitment to the exclusivity of his answer. By an exclusive answer I mean an answer 
which is intended as the only correct answer (see also Benson 1992: 130-131). Instead, 
Euthyphro is willing to permit his candidate for the F to be positioned into a list with 
other (again, unnamed) pious actions (or types of pious actions). 
With this, I hope to have shown that the first answers of both Meno and Euthyphro, and 
Meno’s third answer, provide an incomplete list, and that all encounter the Too Many 
Criticism.  
 
                                                            
5 Grube translates both εἶδος and ἰδέα as ‘form’. Burnet (1979 :111, 116), too, argues that the two words are 
used interchangeably.  
6 There is a controversy over whether Euthyphro is referring to his particular action (his prosecuting his 
father), or to the kind of his action, a universal (prosecuting the religious wrongdoer). The “other” pious 
things would then either be other pious actions or other kinds of pious actions (alternatively, other 
explanations (Nehamas 1999: 163)). This controversy is the topic of chapter II. 
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II. Confusion over Particulars and Universals 
Nehamas speaks of a “universally accepted interpretation imposing an unnatural reading 
on a particular text” (Nehamas 1999: 163). This common approach focuses on the 
metaphysical status of the candidate(s) for the F. The idea is that Socrates rejects Meno’s 
and Euthyphro’s answers because they confuse particulars with universals. On this 
reading, the interlocutors provide a particular, or particulars, whereas Socrates is looking 
for a universal which would be common to all these particulars. I will, in a very general 
way, refer to this as the U-P Confusion Interpretation. 
First, I will look at how authors who discuss universals and particulars in Plato’s works 
use the words ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ (II.1). In II.2, I will give an overview of the 
position of John Burnet, a prominent proponent of the U-P Confusion Interpretation, and 
then show why his position, the way he puts it, is inconsistent. In II.3, I offer a general 
refutation of the U-P Confusion Interpretation.  
I do not claim that Socrates is not looking for a universal. I claim that his interlocutors 
(with one doubtful exception) do not provide particulars, and that Socrates’ criticism is 
not focused on whether the answer provides a universal or a particular. 
 
  II.1 What Are Universals and Particulars? 
Burnet (1979: 111-116) is a proponent of the U-P Confusion Interpretation, as I call it. 
Unfortunately he does not define what he means by ‘particular’ and ‘universal’. Nehamas 
(1999: 159-175), who offers a classic critique of this approach, also does not define 
‘particular’ and ‘universal’. Benson (1992: 123-125) gives an overview of Nehamas’ 
argument, and notes, “Nehamas’ argument presupposes a clear distinction between 
universals and concrete particulars. Unfortunately drawing such a distinction is not as 
easy as one might suppose” (Benson 1992: 123).  
Benson himself gives a helpful definition: 
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Something is a universal just in case it is predicable of a plurality of things, and something 
is a concrete particular just in case it is not. (Benson 1992: 123)7 
According to Benson’s definition, “blue” would be a universal because it applies to various 
different things, while “this blue thing here” would be a particular because it only applies 
to the one object. There can also be particular actions or events, e.g., my writing of this 
thesis. The more generally applicable writing a thesis, on the other hand, would be a 
universal. Let us see whether Burnet, too, might have had this in mind.  
First, consider the paragraph in the Euthyphro where Socrates formulated his question: 
S: So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you clearly knew: what kind 
of thing do you say that godliness and ungodliness are, both as regards murder and 
other things; or is the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious  
the opposite of all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious 
presents us with one form [ἰδέα] or appearance in so far as it is impious? … [E. agrees] 
… S: Tell me then, what is the pious, and what the impious, do you say? (5c-d) 
Regarding this, Burnet says: “ἐν πάσῃ πράξει. These words are of vital importance for the 
argument which follows. It is a universal for which we are looking” (Burnet 1979: 111)8. ἐν 
πάσῃ πράξει means “in every action”. The way I understand it, Burnet takes the fact that 
Socrates claims that the pious is the same in every action to mean that Socrates, when 
looking for the pious, is looking for a universal. The-same-in-many then seems to be a 
central feature of a universal, for Burnet.  
Burnet, just like Benson, also refers to predication: “In several of Plato’s dialogues 
Socrates is made to criticize the confusion of the universal (εἶδος, ἰδέα) with some 
particular of which it is predicated” (Burnet 1979: 112).  In reference to Socrates’ criticism 
that Euthyphro named one or two of the many pious actions (6d), Burnet says: “ἕν τι ἢ 
                                                            
7 Benson (1992: 123, 134) says that this is an “Aristotelian account of this distinction” while pointing out 
that this is not necessarily Aristotle’s exact position. 
8 Burnet’s book is commentary-style in the classic sense, that is, he works through the Euthyphro line-by-
line, sometimes offering page-long commentary on single words or phrases. This is why the paragraphs I 
quote begin in Greek. Burnet quotes the Greek text, and then comments on it. 
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δύο . . . τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων, i.e., one or two particulars of which τὸ ὅσιον may be predicated” 
(Burnet 1979: 116).9 
But Burnet does not explicitly define a universal as that which is predicable of many 
things, which was Benson’s definition. In any case, Burnet seems to attribute two features 
to universals: same-in-many and predicable-of-many. Particulars would then be such 
things which are not same-in-many and predicable-of-many.  
Benson’s definition of universals, viz. that they are predicable of many, does not make a 
metaphysical claim about whether that which is predicated is somehow actually present 
(the same, etc.), in the subject. In contrast, Burnet’s attribution of the feature same-in-
many to universals already adds a metaphysical aspect. But he does not elaborate, and let 
us leave aside the relation of predicability-of-many to sameness-in-many. We should 
simply note that Burnet might have a stronger definition for universals in mind than 
Benson, i.e., maybe some things which are universals by Benson’s definition would not be 
universals by Burnet’ definition. 
 
II.2 Burnet’s Position 
This is what Burnet takes Euthyphro’s first answer to be: “First definition of τὸ ὅσιον 
(5d8-6e9). τὸ ὅσιον is to prosecute offenders against religion”10 (Burnet 1979: 112). Burnet 
offers this explanation for Socrates’ rejecting the answer: 
In several of Plato’s dialogues Socrates is made to criticize the confusion of the 
universal (εἶδος, ἰδέα) with some particular of which it is predicated. Cf. Lach. 191a1 
sqq., Meno 71e1 sqq., Theaet. 146c7 sqq. In the present instance a particular act which 
                                                            
9 Literally, this would translate as “some one or two … of the many piouses” (Grube’s translation reads “…of 
the many pious actions”, likely for readability in English). τῶν πολλῶν ὁσίων is in plural genitive and the 
overall construction is a partitive genitive, that is, it denotes that something – the one or two (piouses) – is 
selected from something (the many piouses). In chapter IV.2, I will claim that these ambiguous “piouses” 
are quite abstract, referring to explanations, or causes. See Smyth’s Greek Grammar 1312 for the genitive of 
the divided whole (=partitive genitive) used with substantive adjectives. The number refers to the 
chapter/topic number and these are the same throughout all editions since 1956 (except in the unfortunate 
Benediction Classics edition). 
10 I will interchangeably use “to prosecute offenders against religion” and “prosecuting offenders against 
religion”. I cannot think of a relevant difference between the two. 
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may be called ὅσιον is adduced, but no account is given of what it is that makes that 
and all other religious acts religious. (Burnet 1979: 112) 
According to this interpretation, then, Euthyphro replies to the question “What is piety?” 
by saying that his particular action is (indeed) pious. If this reading is correct, then 
Socrates’ interlocutors’ replies somehow seem strange, perhaps missing the point of the 
question entirely, and answering another question instead (see also Nehamas 1999: 159, 
165). In the case of Euthyphro, the question could possibly be “Could you give me an 
example of a pious action?”.  
Unfortunately Burnet does not offer a fuller explanation of why we should follow this 
interpretation and seems to take it as obvious that we are dealing with a particular.  
Burnet’s own characterisation “τὸ ὅσιον is to prosecute offenders against religion”, does 
not pick out a particular if we follow Benson’s definition because to prosecute offenders 
against religion is predicable of more than one case. Otherwise we would have to claim 
that Euthyphro is the only one who ever prosecuted offenders against religion and that 
no one else could do this, which I think is an implausible claim.  
How could prosecuting offenders against religion be seen as a particular? Perhaps 
Burnet means that prosecuting offenders against religion (I will call this the M) is not 
present in all pious (F) things and, we could agree with Burnet on this, it thus does not 
give an account of why they are pious. The M would therefore not be the F. Socrates does 
not explicitly make this argument and let us leave open for now whether he may have this 
in mind when he makes the Too Many Criticism.  
For a universal the M, predicable-of-many and same-in-many can be true without the M 
being predicable specifically of many (all) F things and without the M being present and 
the same in many (all) F things and without the M “giving an account” of what makes F 
things F. Prosecuting offenders against religion may not be predicable of all pious things, 
and it may not be in many pious things, but that does not entail that it is not predicable 
of many other things, and that it is not the same in many other things. Presumably, it is 
truly predicable whenever someone is prosecuting offenders against religion, and is the 
same in all these cases. In any case, since Burnet’s claim is that prosecuting offenders 
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against religion cannot be the same in many, the burden is on him to show that this is so. 
But again, Socrates himself makes no such complaint. 
Note that I rejected Burnet’s position on the grounds of his own characterisation of 
Euthyphro’s answer, namely that piety was to prosecute offenders against religion. We 
still need a more general refutation. We cannot assume that all U-P Confusionists would 
follow Burnet’s characterisation of Euthyphro’s answer. And Burnet did not here speak of 
the Meno at all. But I will first look at what the appeal of this line of thinking might be in 
the first place. 
It is difficult to tell how Burnet came to see to prosecute offenders against religion as a 
particular. I am not the first to have difficulty in seeing the motivation for the 
interpretation. Benson, regarding the tradition in general, decries that “the point [that the 
interlocutors are providing universals] seems so obvious that it is difficult to imagine how 
the tradition arose in the first place” (Benson 1992: 125). Nehamas tries to motivate the 
position by pointing out that perhaps authors focus on the first part of the sentence (5d) 
“I say that the pious is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer” (Nehamas 
1999: 161) in the Euthyphro. This may be true for other authors, but Burnet’s 
characterisation highlighted the second part of the sentence and took that as the 
definition. Nehamas also thinks the proponents of this interpretation might read too 
much into an analogy with bees in the Meno (72b-c), where Socrates explains that bees 
are the same in being bees, and that virtues are the same in being virtuous (Nehamas 
1999: 165-166). Nehamas counters that the analogy focuses on the bees being “many and 
of every sort” and on the fact that the same holds for virtues, and that the analogy is not 
used to try to establish that virtues are particulars like bees (Nehamas 1999: 166). 
Finally, Nehamas (1999: 164-165) points out an ambiguity with the word ‘example’, 
namely that universals can be given as examples just as well as particulars. He illustrates 
by saying that we could reply to the question “What is beauty?” by giving as an example 
Charmides or Charmides’ beauty or physical beauty. I could well be giving an example in 
all these cases, but only with the first (or at most the first two, see Nehamas’ footnote 13) 
would I be providing a particular (Nehamas 1999: 164-165).  
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The fact that an answer provides an example or a list of examples need not be tied to any 
specific metaphysical status of these examples. I could even say that I am giving 
“particular examples” without meaning that I am giving examples of particulars. Perhaps 
the proponents of the U-P Confusion Interpretation have not thought through the 
distinction. 
A short summary of chapter II so far: My rejection of Burnet’s stance depended on his 
characterisation of Euthyphro’s answer. Because he does not define ‘particular’ and 
‘universal’, I had to deduce from the way he uses the terms what he might mean by 
‘universal’ and ‘particular’. I concluded that he attributed two features to universals: 
predicable-of-many and same-in-many. I then took his distinction of particulars and 
universals to be such that according to his own characterisation of Euthyphro’s answer, it 
should be clear that the answer picks out a universal.  
I now turn to a more general and hopefully more reliable rejection of the U-P Confusion 
Interpretation. I will take Benson’s distinction between universals and particulars as a 
basis and show that Socrates’ interlocutors do not provide particulars (things which are 
maximally predicable of one thing).  
 
II.3 Criticism of the U-P Confusion Interpretation 
Nehamas (1999: 159-175), as already noted, offers a classic criticism of this approach. He 
provides a detailed analysis of the first answers in the Meno, the Euthyphro, the Laches 
and the Hippias Major, all of which have been characterised as providing particulars.  
Regarding the Euthyphro, Nehamas’ (1999: 161-163) main point is to show that the “main 
burden” of Euthyphro’s answer “I say then that the pious is what I am now doing: 
prosecuting anyone who is in the wrong in questions of murder…” (5d, the translation is 
Nehamas’) falls on the latter half of the sentence. Nehamas offers a linguistic analysis of 
the Greek text of the Euthyphro. He tries to show that Euthyphro refers to the kind of his 
action (avenging/prosecuting a religious wrong), not to his particular action 
(Euthyphro’s prosecuting his father), and that this is how Socrates understands 
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Euthyphro. The first part simply specifies that Euthyphro’s own action is of this kind 
(Nehamas 1999: 161-163).11  
As for the Meno, armed with the distinction that we can construe an answer as giving an 
example without construing it as providing a particular, Nehamas suggests that Meno, 
when he distinguishes between different virtues for a man, for a woman, etc., is “citing 
different kinds of virtue, different ways of being virtuous, not particular virtuous things” 
(Nehamas 1999:165). Benson (1992: 123-125) agrees and adds regarding Meno’s first 
answer that Meno’s candidate for men’s virtue, “managing the affairs of the city, treating 
one’s friends well, and obeying one’s man…are presumably truly predicable of a number 
of successful fifth-century Athenian politicians”, and that his candidate for women’s 
virtue, “managing the household well, preserving its possessions, and obeying one’s 
man…are universals, unfortunately probably truly predicable of a number of fifth-century 
Athenian women” (Benson 1992: 125).  
Regarding Meno’s third answer to the question “What is virtue?”, courage is a virtue, and 
moderation, wisdom, and munificence and very many others, Nehamas simply adds that 
these are “not likely to be considered as particulars by anyone” (Nehamas 1999: 166) – 
apparently, for better or for worse, appealing to our intuition on the matter.  
But we can rely on a more relevant intuition – Socrates’. Socrates is very unlikely to 
consider courage, moderation, etc. as particulars. First note that Socrates does not object 
to Meno’s third answer on the grounds that Meno is not providing virtues. Instead, by 
saying that they have found many virtues while he wants to find the one “which covers all 
the others” (74a), he seems to agree that these are virtues. Second, notice that in the 
Meno, Socrates is trying to find out what virtue itself is, while in the Laches, Socrates is 
looking for what courage is. In the Meno courage is considered as an example of virtue, 
and in the Laches it is characterised as a sub-virtue (“a part of virtue”) (190b-d). In the 
Charmides (159a), the question is what is moderation (σωφροσύνη) (in the Meno 
considered as an example of virtue). In the later dialogue the Theaetetus, knowledge is 
                                                            
11 I am not sure how Burnet would react to this criticism, because Burnet’s characterisation of Euthyphro’s 
first answer (to prosecute offenders against religion) already focused on the second part of the sentence 
but he still claimed that we are dealing with a particular (Burnet 1979: 112). Nehamas, in opposition, takes 
it as just as obvious that it is a universal: “…and that is very general and abstract indeed; its force is that to 
prosecute anyone who has wronged the religious order is (the) pious…” (Nehamas 1999: 161). 
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sought, with knowledge being equated with wisdom (145e) (in the Meno considered as an 
example of virtue). Additionally, in the Euthyphro, Socrates characterises piety as part of 
justice (11e ff.), although as a hypothetical. It seems very reasonable that both Socrates 
and Meno would happily include piety in this incomplete list of virtues (“and very many 
others”).  
But, if by saying that Meno’s third answer provides too many candidates, Socrates means 
that the problem was that particulars were offered instead of universals, then he would 
apparently himself be counting wisdom, moderation, and the “very many other” virtues 
as particulars. If that were the case, however, then his alleged reproach (as claimed by 
Burnet) in the Euthypho that Euthyphro failed to provide a universal would become 
incoherent, and the same holds for the other dialogues. We would be forced to say that in 
the Meno, Socrates considers sub-virtues to be particulars, and that in the Euthyphro and 
elsewhere, he demands that the same things be universals. Instead of ascribing this 
inchorence to Socrates, the simpler explanation is that Socrates does not mean to say that 
Meno’s third answer provides particulars.  
Sub-virtues are also well in line with our definition of universals, which is that universals 
are predicable of more than one thing.  
So far we have seen that neither Meno’s first answer nor Meno’s third answer picks out 
particulars (things which are predicable of maximally one thing), and additionally we 
have seen that if we ascribe to Socrates the position that Meno’s third answer is providing 
particulars, then his demand (assuming with the confusionists that he is making such a 
demand) for a universal in the Euthyphro becomes hopelessly incomprehensible.  
Consider a further point. Assuming you are by now convinced that in the Meno, the 
problem does not lie with particulars, then could you still maintain that Euthyphro 
provides a particular? Well, if you focus on the first part of “I say that the pious is to do 
what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer”, possibly. I think that it is irrelevant 
for our purposes. But let us suppose that Nehamas’ analysis is wrong and that in the 
Euthyphro, contra the Meno, the interlocutor does in fact offer a particular as the answer. 
If that is so, our situation is that the Too Many Criticism is made in two cases where 
universals are provided (Meno’s answers), and in one case where a particular is provided 
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(Euthyphro’s answer) underlining my point that the Too Many Criticism is agnostic on 
the metaphysical status of the members of the given set. That is, whatever is wrong with 
lists as lists, it is not that they provide particulars (of course, Socrates would probably in 
the end not be happy with a particular for the definition of virtue or piety). 
In this chapter I hope to have shown that Meno does not provide particulars, and that it 
is very unlikely that Euthyphro does. Socrates also does not complain that they do. 
 
III. Geach and the Socratic Fallacy 
Another suggestion is by P. T. Geach in the article “Plato’s Euthyphro: An Analysis and 
Commentary” (1966: 369-382). Referencing this article, Nehamas (1999: 160) lumps 
Geach’s position together with the U-P Confusion Interpretation and takes Geach to be a 
paradigmatic example of the tradition. Nehamas thinks that Geach thinks that Socrates 
thinks that his interlocutors confuse universals with particulars (Nehamas 1999: 160-
161). I doubt that this is what Geach says. And even if Nehamas is right and Geach does 
claim that Socrates’ interlocutors confuse universals and particulars, Geach makes a 
separate point worth our consideration. In III.1, I will look at how Nehamas characterises 
Geach and show why I doubt this characterisation is correct. In III.2, I will outline what I 
think to be Geach’s main point. I then criticise this point. 
 
III.1 Nehamas’ Characterisation of Geach 
Nehamas quotes two paragraphs from Geach. These paragraphs outline why Geach thinks 
that Socrates rejects Euthyphro’s first answer: 
(G1) [Socrates] adopts a line of argument that we find paralleled in many dialogues. 
If Euthyphro really knows that his own action is pious then he must be able to say 
what is pious; he must not just give examples of pious actions, like his own action or 
again the punishment of sacrilegious robbery... (Geach 1966: 370-371) 
(G2) Let us rather concentrate on two assumptions Socrates makes: (A) that if you 
know you are correctly predicating a given term ‘F’ you must “know what it is to be 
F”, in the sense of being able to give a general criterion of a thing’s being F; (B) that 
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it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of ‘F’ by citing examples of things that 
are F. (Geach 1966: 371)12 
These assumptions together form what Geach calls the “Socratic fallacy” (Nehamas 1999: 
160). After quoting these paragraphs, Nehamas asks: “Is it really clear that Euthyphro 
and others like him respond to the Socratic question by citing concrete instances of 
universals instead of universals themselves, and does Socrates ever complain that they 
do? My answer to both these questions is categorically negative” (Nehamas 1999: 161).  
Nehamas, then, takes (G1-G2) as saying that Socrates’ interlocutors provide particulars 
and that Socrates criticises this. But, first, Geach’s whole article never mentions 
universals, and the word ‘particular’ occurs only three times, all of which are irrelevant, a 
la “…the verb ‘to love’ in particular” (Geach 1966: 378).  
I think Nehamas is basing his claim simply on (G1-G2), which is what he is directly 
replying to. I can only guess why Nehamas thinks that these paragraphs make the 
distinction between universals and particulars. First, Geach speaks about examples. But 
if Nehamas makes his claim based on this fact, then he is ignoring his own point, namely 
that we can give examples of both universals or particulars. Since (G1-G2) make no 
reference to universals or particulars, I see no immediate reason to think that Geach is 
using the word ‘example’ to specifically mean ‘particular’. The second possible source for 
Nehamas’ claim is the first assumption Geach attributes to Socrates: “(A) that if you know 
you are correctly predicating a given term ‘F’ you must “know what it is to be F,” in the 
sense of being able to give a general criterion of a thing’s being F” (Geach 1966: 371). Here 
Geach speaks of predication. But he does not specify what is predicated of what. I could 
well be predicating a universal of a universal. I think that this is what happens with 
Meno’s third answer, courage is a virtue, and moderation, etc.  Geach says nothing about 
predication which would commit him to the position that predication only involves 
universals being predicated of particulars. Third, in (G1), Geach refers to “pious actions, 
like his own action or again the punishment of sacrilegious robbery” (Geach 1966: 371). 
In parallel to how Nehamas analysed Euthyphro’s first answer, in focusing on the second 
part of the sentence, we might do the same courtesy to Geach. Yes, if Geach was only 
                                                            
12 Geach uses ‘T’ as the placeholder. I have changed the placeholders to ‘F’ in the quotes, making no other 
changes. 
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referring to Euthyphro’s “own action”, then we would likely have to see it as a particular, 
but he does say “or again, the punishment of sacrilegiuous robbery”, which does not seem 
to be a particular (admittedly, I am here simply employing intuition). 
Finally, perhaps Nehamas thinks that the word ‘thing’ in the phrase “citing examples of 
things that are F” (G2), can only refer to a particular. But ‘thing’ is a natural word to use 
in this phrase and I cannot think of a good alternative if I want to avoid specifically 
referring to either universals or particulars. One option would be to cumbersomely say 
“citing examples of universals or particulars that are F”. But I think ‘thing’ can well be 
used as a vague placeholder.13  
Considering all this, I think that it is an open question whether Geach thought that 
Socrates’ interlocutors were providing particulars and that Socrates found fault with this. 
While admitting that I cannot show that Nehamas’ interpretation is wrong, I find it 
unlikely. I think we should not attribute the U-P Confusion Interpretation to Geach 
because he does not explicitly say that Socrates’ interlocutors offer particulars, and also 
because Geach’s Socratic Fallacy argument does not depend on such attribution. The 
argument is phrased in terms of examples, and it can be taken seriously regardless of what 
(or any) metaphysical status Geach has in mind for the examples. The argument is 
epistemological, focusing on how we can know. I will now look at this argument. 
 
III.2 The Socratic Fallacy, and Why Socrates Does Not Commit It 
Geach (1966: 371), then, attributes to Socrates (A) (“if you know you are correctly 
predicating a given term ‘F’ you must “know what it is to be F””) and (B) (“it is no use to 
try and arrive at the meaning of ‘F’ by citing examples of things that are F”). 
Geach (1966: 371) thinks that (A), taken together with (B), form a fallacy.  
                                                            
13 This is exactly what David Sedley (1998: 115) does when discussing the Phaedo: “When I say “the thing 
Responsible”, my word “thing” is deliberately vague. Plato does not in this context show the slightest 
interest in distinguishing between metaphysically different kinds of thing: the thing considered as a 
candidate for the cause of some effect can just as well be a physical stuff like fire or bone, a mathematical 
process like addition, the good, a soul, intelligence, or a Form such as Largeness or Oddness” (Sedley 1998: 
115). 
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Geach (1966: 371) first claims that (B) follows directly from (A). The idea is that if (A) is 
true, then examples cannot help you in trying to understand the meaning of ‘F’ because 
in order to know that you are presenting correct examples you already would need to 
know the “general account”, or “definition”. Geach (1966: 371) then claims that (A) is false 
because you can know “heaps of things” without knowing their definition. What is more, 
you can explain something in terms of examples (=B is false as well) (Geach 1966: 371).  
According to Geach, the reality is that parties to a discussion instead need to either agree 
to the examples they are using, and they can then look for a criterion for these examples, 
or agree to the criterion, and look for examples. If they agree on neither, then the 
discussion will be “abortive”, “futile”, and neither will understand what the other means 
by ‘F’ (Geach 1966: 372). But Geach denies any epistemological primacy of criterions, 
definitions or general accounts over examples.  
I will deny that Socrates believes (A) (“if you know you are correctly predicating a given 
term ‘F’ you must “know what it is to be F””). I agree that Socrates believes a version of 
(B) (“it is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of ‘F’ by citing examples of things that 
are F”). But (B) alone does not constitute the fallacy Geach has in mind. 
First I will look at whether there is any support for the claim that Socrates believes (A). 
Geach bases his analysis on the paragraphs 5d and 6d (Geach 1966: 371) and, I think, 6e, 
in the Euthyphro, even though curiously Geach does not explicitly refer to the third. At 
5d, Socrates established that the pious is “the same and alike in every action…everything 
[that is pious] presents us with one form”. 6d added the claim that the form of piety 
“makes all pious things pious”. At 6e, Socrates said: “Tell me then what this form itself is, 
so that I may look upon it, and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s 
that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not” (6e).  
6e is the best support I can find for premise  (A). But I agree with Nehamas’ (1999: 173, 
footnote 7) criticism that 6e only makes the Weak Claim, which is that that if you know 
the form (Nehamas says “definition”), then you will know about everything (or every kind 
of thing) whether it is pious. But Socrates does not make the Strong Claim, which is that 
that if you do not know the form, then you do not know about anything whether it is pious. 
There may be other ways to know, but only knowing the form will give you something to 
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decide for every case. Geach’s fallacy, however, does not result from the Weak Claim 
(Nehamas 1999: 173). The Weak Claim does not entail that you cannot know about a given 
thing (be it a particular or a universal) whether it is pious or not without knowing the 
form.  
Geach only focuses on the Euthyphro. But is there any support for his claim of a Socratic 
Fallacy in the Meno? The Meno begins with Meno asking “Socrates, can virtue be taught?” 
(70a). Socrates immediately claims that he does not know whether virtue can be taught 
because he “does not even have any knowledge of what virtue itself is” (71a). Perhaps this 
can be read as saying that you cannot know what properties virtue has without knowing 
the general definition or account, etc., of virtue. But even if this is what Socrates is saying, 
it does not mean that you cannot know what things are virtuous and which are not. 
Knowing that something is virtuous assumes, minimally, that you can correctly predicate 
‘virtue’ of something, but it does not assume that you know how to correctly predicate 
something of ‘virtue’. This is also in line with Geach’s own point, namely that you either 
have to agree on examples or a general account to carry on a conversation about what 
something is. It can well be the case that you know which examples you definitely want to 
count as virtue without yet knowing what the definition of virtue is, and that you are 
looking for a general criterion which would apply to all these examples. But before you 
know this criterion, it is likely that you will not know what properties virtue has. You will 
know that once you have the general criterion.  
I cannot find in the Euthyphro or in the Meno the Strong Claim which is necessary for 
Geach’s premise (A). 
My second objection to Geach’s approach is that Socrates himself makes good use of 
examples. For example, right after rejecting Euthyphro’s second answer – what is dear to 
the gods is pious (7a) – Socrates gives “numbers”, “heavier” and “lighter” as examples of 
things about which we can more easily resolve differences (7b-c), and “the just and the 
unjust, the beautiful and the ugly, the good and the bad” as examples of things about 
which disagreements can get heated and which are not easily resolved (7c-d). Even more 
clearly, in the Laches, in reply to Laches’ definition of courage as to stand one’s ground 
against the enemy, Socrates explains that this (to stand one’s ground against the enemy) 
is only proper for certain hoplites, while (for example) chariots are not supposed to stand 
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their ground no matter what, but rather move about quickly and escape if necessary – 
Laches agrees (191a-c). In the Meno, we find the following use of examples: 
S: I am asking whether it is only in the case of virtue that there is one for man, another 
for woman and so on, or is the same true in the case of health and size and strength? 
Do you think that there is one health for man and another for woman? Or, if it is 
health, does it have the same form everywhere, whether in man or in anything else 
whatever?...And so with size and strength? (72d-e) 
Also, when Socrates rejected Meno’s second answer, virtue is to be able to rule over men, 
he said: “For example, if you wish, take roundness, about which I would say that it is a 
shape, but not simply that it is shape” (73e).  
The fact that Socrates freely uses examples shows that he cannot believe (A). If he believes 
(B), it is for some other reason. Regardless of the status of (B), then, I deny that there is a 
fallacy at play, since Geach claimed that (B) follows from (A) and that together, they form 
the fallacy.  
Admittedly, Socrates, unlike his interlocutors, is not using examples to define anything 
(e.g., in the Laches he is using an example to refute Laches’ answer). So perhaps Socrates 
does believe Geach’s (B): “It is no use to try and arrive at the meaning of ‘F’ by citing 
examples of things that are F”, without believing (A): “If you know you are correctly 
predicating a given term ‘F’ you must “know what it is to be F””.  
In the Meno, Socrates did say: “Even if they [virtues] are many and various, all of them 
have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when 
one is asked to make clear what virtue is” (72c).  
But (B), as Geach puts it, is ambiguous. What does “no use to try” mean? If it means that 
examples have no useful purpose in search of a definition, then Socrates does not say this. 
I think Socrates does not accept examples as the correct answer to his question, but that 
is not the same as denying the usefulness of examples. But if Geach’s (B) means that 
Socrates does not accept examples as the correct answer, then I am in agreement with 
Geach on (B). It is basically the same as the Too Many Criticism, according to which giving 
one or more examples for the candidate of the F is, for some yet unknown reason, not the 
correct answer.  
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To conclude, if Geach’s approach were correct, it would explain well why lists of examples 
are rejected by Socrates. On this approach, Socrates would be denying that I can even 
know that something is an example of F if I do not know what the F is. But Geach’s 
interpretation rests on Socrates making the Strong Claim in the Euthyphro, and Socrates 
only makes the Weak Claim. The Strong Claim is not made in the Meno, either. In 
addition, Socrates himself makes good use of examples. 
 
IV. Narrowness and Explanations 
In this chapter, I consider two additional suggestions of what might be wrong with the 
Three Answers. The first is that they do not provide what Nehamas calls a “single 
explanation” or “principle” for F things (Nehamas 1999: 163), and which I will also call a 
“cause”. “Explanation” is here to be understood as a metaphysical explanation: the 
explanation is whatever “makes” F things be F, i.e., explains their being F. I will try to 
show that this is indeed what Socrates thinks is wrong with the Three Answers and that 
this is why Socrates complains of too many Fs given by the answers. But Nehamas (1999: 
163) links this claim to another claim (specifically for the Euthyphro), namely that 
Euthyphro provides a too narrow definition. Alternatively, Nehamas calls this a failure 
against “generality” (Nehamas 1999: 163). He claims that when Euthyphro gives his 
definition of piety (to prosecute the religious wrongdoer) and Socrates asks whether 
there are other piouses14, he is offering Euthyphro the following choice: if Euthyphro says 
no, then his definition is too narrow; if Euthyphro says yes, then he fails to provide a single 
explanation (Nehamas 1999: 163). I will call this supposed difficult choice “Euthyphro’s 
Fork”. I deny that Euthyphro faces such a choice. I agree with Nehamas that Euthyphro’s 
answer fails to provide a single explanation, but I do not agree that Socrates in any way 
claims that if Euthyphro denies there are other piouses then the definition is too narrow. 
No Too Narrow Criticism is made in the Euthyphro.  
                                                            
14 Following Nehamas (1999: 163), I deliberately use the odd-sounding ‘piouses’ in this chapter. In Greek, 
ὁσίων is vague, and could refer to things which are pious, or to something more abstract (thus the whole 
confusion in chapter two over universals and particulars).  
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Nehamas does not make a Too Narrow Criticism for the Meno, but I will nevertheless 
consider whether Meno’s first and third answers might be too narrow. I will conclude that 
Meno’s first and third answers cannot be too narrow, and that in the Meno Socrates makes 
the Too Many Criticism for exactly the same reason as he did in the Euthyphro: the 
answers do not provide a single explanation. 
In IV.1, I discuss Euthyphro’s Fork, and whether Euthyphro’s first answer might be too 
narrow. I claim that it is not. I will also show why Meno’s first and third answers are not 
too narrow. 
In IV.2, I will argue that Socrates demands a single explanation for why all F things are F. 
The Three Answers all provide more than one explanation, and this is why Socrates makes 
the Too Many Criticism.15 All I wish to establish is that there is some sort of explanatory 
relation such that the F explains the fact that F things are F; and that Socrates believes 
that such an explanation is provided by just a single thing, the form. 
 
IV.1 Euthyphro’s Fork 
This is what Nehamas says regarding Euthyphro’s first answer:  
[Euthyphro] does not, to repeat, confuse universals with their instances: he offers too 
narrow a definition of what to be pious is. In this way he either excludes obviously 
pious things (all sacrifices before journeys, for example); or else he admits, contrary 
to his earlier claim, that there is, after all, nothing common to all those things that we 
consider pious. The “many other piouses”, pace Burnet, are not particular pious 
things, but distinct explanations of what makes everything that is pious, pious. 
(Nehamas 1999: 163) 
The way I understand Nehamas is that when Socrates asks Euthyphro whether there are 
other pious actions, he is offering Euthyphro a fork:  
Either choose 
                                                            
15 I will not in this essay try to decide exactly what sort of or explanation, or cause, Socrates is assuming 
here. Possibly, it is some sort of metaphysical grounding. In any case, I do not think that it is material 
causation. See e.g., Bliss and Trogdon (2014) for a discussion on metaphysical grounding. 
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(V1) piety is just what is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer, and nothing else is 
piety 
and your definition is too narrow; or choose 
(V2) piety is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer, and there are many other 
piouses (~other explanations for what makes things pious) 
and your definition is inconsistent with your admission that there is only one explanation 
for pious things, the one form of piety. 
I agree with what Nehamas says about (V2), and I think that this is what is wrong with 
lists as answers to the “What is the F?” question. I will argue for this in the next chapter. 
But I disagree with the other leg of the fork. I will argue that no narrowness criticism is 
made in the Euthyphro at all.  
Here is a short introduction of narrowness and broadness. A definition of F is too narrow 
if it does not pick out all F things16. A definition is too broad if it picks out things which 
are not F. Let us assume that the set of all F things is, in fact, {a, b, c}. A too narrow 
definition would pick out, e.g.  {a, b}, and a too broad definition would pick out, e.g. {a, b, 
c, d}. Narrowness and broadness are not mutually exclusive. One could give a definition 
which is both too broad and too narrow. Such a definition would pick out, e.g. {a, b, d}. It 
would be too narrow because it would fail to pick out c, which is F, and it would be too 
broad because it would pick out d, which is not F. 
Now, lists need not be too narrow. Nehamas, speaking of the Laches, notices that “…the 
stronger error [as opposed to a narrow-definition-error], confusing universals with their 
instances, does not actually constitute a failure in respect of generality: no matter how 
complete we make our list of courageous individuals, we will never begin to supply the 
sort of answer that Socrates wants. We will never give any, let alone a single, explanation 
of what makes all these things courageous” (Nehamas 1999: 165). I will, for now, ignore 
the discussion of a “single explanation”. But I would like to emphasise that Nehamas 
speaks of complete lists of particulars, and that such lists would not fail against generality. 
                                                            
16 I am still using the word ‘thing’ in a very general way. It could refer to a particular or to a universal. See 
also my footnote [13]. 
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I take it that by not failing in respect of generality he means that they would not be too 
narrow. But I think this logic should also apply to universals. One could give a complete 
list regardless of whether it consists of universals or particulars, and one would not give 
a too narrow answer. It is conceivable, even if pragmatically impossible, that in reply to 
the “What is the F?” question one gives the complete set of particulars which are F. But 
more importantly, it is quite possible to give a complete set of universals which are F.  
So, first, complete lists are not too narrow. But also consider this. A Too Narrow Criticism 
can only be made about unambiguous lists, that is, against lists which explicitly 
enumerate all the members. If the list ends with something like “and many others”, then 
I will never know whether it is missing some crucial members or not. It may or may not 
be among the “many others”. Of course such a list could be criticised for precisely that 
ambiguity, but that is an entirely different matter and, as far as I can tell, Socrates never 
makes this criticism. 
Euthyphro’s specified answer (V2) piety is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer, and 
there are many other piouses is precisely this kind of ambiguous list as it ends with “very 
many others”. 
Now, I do think that (V1) piety is just what is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer, and 
nothing else is piety, would, according to Euthyphro’s own admission of alternative 
piouses (universals, explanations), be a too narrow definition of piety. But, I think that 
this is irrelevant, since (V1) is never Euthyphro’s answer. His unspecified answer is piety 
is to prosecute the wrongdoer, and his specified answer is (V2).  
The question is, when Socrates asks whether there are other piouses, is he (1) setting up 
a Too Narrow Criticism, or is he simply (2) specifying what Euthyphro means by his 
definition? Since no Too Narrow Criticism is explicitly made, and instead a Too Many 
Criticism is made, we can conclude that Socrates was simply asking for more information 
to understand what Euthyphro’s answer was. If Socrates did not need further 
information, then he could just immediately have made either the Too Narrow Criticism 
or the Too Many Criticism: 
On the one hand, the Too Many Criticism is plausible if it is applied to (V2), a list, but it is 
misapplied if it is applied to (V1). It makes no sense for Socrates to complain of “one or 
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two of the many piouses”, that is, for him to make the Too Many Criticism if Euthyphro’s 
answer is (V1). 
On the other hand, the Too Narrow Criticism is plausible if it is applied to (V1), but as I 
argued in the previous chapter, it is not correct against ambiguous lists, and (V2) provides 
just such a list.  
Socrates’ Too Many Criticism is applied to (V2), which is Euthyphro’s full answer after the 
specification. If Euthyphro had denied other piouses, which was a possibility for him, then 
his answer would have been (V1) piety is just what is to prosecute the religious 
wrongdoer, and nothing else is, and it could possibly have been too narrow. But he did 
not choose (V1), and Socrates makes no comment on it. What would have happened if 
Euthyphro had chosen (V1) is speculation. So my conclusion is that Euthyphro’s first 
answer does not encounter a Too Narrow Criticism from Socrates.  
This means that Socrates’ criticism does not rely on there being other “obviously pious 
things” besides prosecuting the religious wrongdoer, contrary to what Nehamas claimed. 
This would have made Socrates’ criticism be that Euthyphro’s candidate for piety, {to 
prosecute the religious wrongdoer}, fails against the objective, real-world  set {to 
prosecute the religious wrongdoer, …other obviously pious things}. This would have 
brought up a whole range of issues about how Socrates could appeal to “obviousness”, 
and fortunately we can avoid them altogether. 
Socrates, then, does not present Euthyphro with a fork. 
Let us see that Meno’s answers are not too narrow, either. Meno’s first and third answer 
also end with “and very many other virtues” (71e-72a). They are resistant to any 
narrowness criticism because they are ambiguous lists (the “very many others” 
conveniently “completes” the list). In order to claim that these definitions are too narrow, 
you would have to show that they are definitely incomplete, that missing some virtues. 
This perhaps could be done by first charging Meno with laziness and demanding that he 
elaborate what the “very many other” virtues are, and not to leave them unnamed. And 
once he has given an enumerated list which still does not include something that is in fact 
a virtue, then it is incomplete, and open to a Too Narrow Criticism. But Socrates does not 
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challenge the completeness of the lists, and makes no such demands, and instead 
complains that there are too many virtues.  
Note that the Too Many Criticism is not the same as the Too Broad Criticism. A Too Broad 
Criticism would claim that an answer picks out some things which are not F. The Too 
Many Criticism claims that the answer cannot name more than one exclusively-intended 
thing in the first place, and that this one thing has to somehow explain all F things. I will 
now turn to explain the Too Many Criticism. 
 
IV.2 The Three Answers Fail to Provide a Single Explanation 
I will now argue that when Socrates asks the “What is the F?” question, he is looking for 
a single explanation.  
In the Euthyphro, just before Socrates formulates the question “What is piety?”, he asks 
Euthyphro:  
[Is] the pious not the same and alike in every action, and the impious the opposite of 
all that is pious and like itself, and everything that is to be impious presents us with 
one form or appearance in so far as it is impious? (5d)  
When Euthyphro has given an answer, Socrates replies:  
Bear in mind then that I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions 
but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious 
actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form, or don’t you 
remember? (6d) 
So, one form “makes” pious actions pious. Similarly, in the Meno, soon after Meno gives 
his first answer, Socrates says that “even if they [virtues] are many and various, all of them 
have one and the same form which makes them virtues” (72c). 
David Sedley (1998: 115) argues on his commentary for the later dialogue Phaedo that 
Plato interchangeably uses the following Greek words and phrases to express causation:  
 (1) αἴτιον/ αἰτία: “cause”/”causation” 
(2) διά + accusative, or causal dative: “because of” 
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(3) ποιεῖν = “to cause (to)”, “to make (F)” 
For example, in the Euthyphro, at 6d (“that form itself that makes all pious actions 
pious”), the relevant Greek phrase τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν indeed uses the 
causal dative. In the Meno, at 72c (“all of them have one and the same form which makes 
them virtues”), the Greek phrase ἕν γέ τι εἶδος ταὐτὸν ἅπασαι ἔχουσιν δι᾽ ὃ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί 
uses the διά + accusative construction. 
We can divide Socrates’ claim into two. (C1) there is an explanation, or cause, for the fact 
that F things are F. (C2) The explanation is just one (single form) for all F things.  
Now, in reply to Euthyphro’s answer, piety is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer, 
Socrates asked whether there were “many other piouses”, and Euthyphro agreed (6d). 
Nehamas (1999: 163) suggests that these “other piouses”  are “other, nonoverlapping 
explanations; for example, sacrificing before a journey” (Nehamas 1999: 163). I agree with 
this characterisation. If this is correct, then the lists are lists of explanations. For example, 
Meno’s third answer, courage is a virtue, moderation is a virtue, and so on, gives 
different explanations for why particular pious things are pious. This could go something 
like this: Euthyphro is pious because he is prosecuting the religious wrongdoer, x is pious 
because he prays every day, etc. Similarly, following Meno’s first answer, explanations for 
why someone is virtuous would be: this woman is virtuous because she manages the 
household well, this man is virtuous because he manages public affairs well, and so on. 
Regarding Meno’s third answer, the explanations would be, a la, Laches is virtuous 
because he is courageous, Euthyphro is virtuous because he is pious, and so on.   
Socrates’ complaint, then, that the interlocutors give too many “piouses” or “virtues”, 
means that there are too many explanations for the fact that F things are F. The 
interlocutors make a mistake against premise (C2). In the case of Euthyphro, since 
Euthyphro agreed to (C2) before giving his answer, Socrates’ criticism could perhaps be 
seen as saying that Euthyphro is not consistent. Euthyphro’s answer is contrary to  
premise (C2) which he himself admitted. Nehamas claims something like this: 
“…Euthyphro’s answer, in characteristic elenctic fashion, is shown to be inconsistent” 
(Nehamas 1999: 163). 
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However, in the Meno, unlike in the Euthyphro, Socrates does not secure Meno’s 
agreement with the premise that there is a single form or explanation before the 
formulation of his question. So when he makes his Too Many Criticism in the Meno, his 
reason cannot be Meno’s inner inconsistency on the grounds that Meno’s answer does not 
provide a single explanation – Meno never promised a single explanation. Instead, 
Socrates actively argues in favour of a single explanation, after Meno’s first answer. He 
brings up his bees-analogy (72a-c), claiming that bees are the same in being bees (and 
Meno agrees to this). Socrates then says: 
Even if they [virtues] are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which 
makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what 
virtue is. (72c) 
Meno denies that in case of virtues there is such a thing, but Socrates tries to convince 
him otherwise (72e-73c). Because Socrates actively defends the claim, I think that 
Socrates is himself committed to the premise there is such a single form (explanation) for 
virtue. When Socrates makes his Too Many Criticism, both for Meno’s first and third 
answers, his point is not that Meno is inconsistent with any earlier claims he admitted to. 
Socrates’ claim is stronger: there is, in fact, only one explanation, and Meno unfortunately 
provided more.  
Taking this into account, and considering that in the Euthyphro, Euthyphro did not bring 
up the single form himself (he simply agreed with Socrates that there is such a thing), I 
conclude that the Too Many Criticism is, in the Three Answers, made by Socrates against 
answers which provide a list, and that its force is to actually deny that there is more than 
one explanation for why F things are F.17  
I hope to have established in this chapter that Socrates assumes there is something which 
explains why F things are F. And that this explanatory relation, whatever it is, is such that 
only one thing (the form) explains why all F things are F. 
Socrates rejects many explanations, and instead appeals to the one common form which 
“makes” all F things be F (i.e., explains them). This means that Socrates has very strong 
                                                            
17 See David Wolfsdorf (2013) for an overview of the literature on the Socratic Method and whether Socrates 
is testing his interlocutors’ inner consistency or whether he is making objective claims about ethical 
subjects. 
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sense of what can and what cannot count as an explanation. His understanding of 
explanation is such that it probably excludes a lot of explanations which ordinarily would 
be counted as explanations. That there can be only one explanation for why F things are 
F is a surprising claim and in the Meno and the Euthyphro, it is simply asserted by 
Socrates, but we do not find out why. This remains the task of another work.18  
 
Conclusion 
I considered two dialogues where Socrates asks the “What is the F?” question: the Meno 
(“What is virtue?”) and the Euthyphro (“What is piety?”). I focused on three answers: 
Euthyphro’s first, and Meno’s first and third. In chapter I, I established that Socrates 
makes a Too Many Criticism against all the Three Answers. This is the complaint that 
Socrates’ interlocutors name more than one F.  
I first showed that in the Meno, Meno gives a list for his first and third attempts at 
answering the “What is virtue?” question. It was immediately clear from the text that 
Meno provides a list. But, a bit more controversially, I also claimed that Euthyphro’s first 
answer to the question “What is piety?” gives a list. I had to motivate this claim. 
Euthyphro’s first answer was that piety is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer and this 
did not seem to be a list at first sight. But right after Euthyphro provided his answer, 
Socrates asked whether there were “many other [kinds of] pious actions”, and Euthyphro 
agreed. I showed that this is what Socrates took as the answer: piety is to prosecute the 
religious wrongdoer, and there are very many other (kinds of) pious actions. That is, 
Euthyphro’s intent was to name a member of a list. I showed that Euthyphro’s answer, 
and Meno’s first and third answers, all encounter, in various wordings, the Too Many 
Criticism from Socrates, (“one or two of the pious…”, “…swarm of virtues”, “…we have 
found many virtues while looking for one…”). 
In chapter II, I started to look at why the Too Many Criticism is made, i.e., why Socrates 
rejects the Three Answers. I considered a well-known interpretation which is that the 
                                                            
18 See for a discussion of explanations the later dialogue the Phaedo (100d-105c). 
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issue might be that the interlocutors are providing particulars whereas Socrates is looking 
for a universal. I agree that Socrates is looking for a universal, but for several reasons I 
rejected the suggestion that the interlocutors provide particulars instead, among others 
for the reason that what should on this interpretation be particulars in the Meno, are 
elsewhere the very things about which Socrates asks his question “What is the F?” The 
other main argument was that the candidates for the F which are offered by Meno and 
Euthyphro are predicable of many things, and are therefore universals. 
In chapter III, I considered another suggestion – by Geach (1966) – which was that 
Socrates rejects Euthyphro’s answer because Socrates commits a fallacy (the so-called 
Socratic Fallacy). The main premise of this interpretation was that Socrates thought that 
it is not possible to know whether something is an example of F if you do not know the 
definition of F. I did not dispute Geach’s position that we do not, in fact, need to know the 
definition of F in order to be able to predicate F. But I denied that Socrates believes such 
a position in the first place, and as proof I showed that Socrates himself freely uses  
examples.  
In chapter IV, I introduced Nehamas’ position. Socrates asked Euthyphro (whose answer 
was piety is to prosecute the religious wrongdoer) whether he thought that there were 
other piouses. Nehamas’ claim was that with this, Socrates was giving Euthyphro a choice: 
if he says yes, Euthyphro will fail to give a single explanation (which is what was asked 
for, and with which Euthyphro earlier agreed) for pious things; if he says no, then his 
answer is too narrow, excluding obviously pious things. I called this “Euthyphro’s Fork”. 
On the one hand, I disagreed with Nehamas that if Euthyphro had said no, then his 
answer would have been too narrow. Socrates makes no Too Narrow Criticism at all. But 
I agree with the other leg of the fork, that Euthyphro provided an answer which failed to 
give a single explanation. I argued that the Too Many Criticism makes the point that 
Euthyphro gives too many explanations (and that the same holds for the Meno). Socrates 
is assuming that there is only one explanation for why F things are F. He rejects, for 
example, explanations of the type that Euthyphro could be virtuous because he is pious, 
and Laches is virtuous because he is courageous. He only accepts explanations for 
consideration which claim to explain for all F why they are F. 
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Lists in the Meno and the Euthyphro 
Mark Hallap 
Abstract 
 
In Plato’s Socratic dialogues the Meno and the Euthyphro, all attempts at answering 
Socrates’ “What is the F?” question are rejected, but some answers are rejected in a 
peculiar way. Socrates complains that Euthyphro’s first answer, and Meno’s first and 
third answers, provide “too many” things for the F. This thesis considers several 
competing suggestions for why Socrates rejects these answers. The following suggestions 
are argued to be unhelpful: (1) that Socrates’ interlocutors provide particulars instead of 
universals, (2) that Socrates makes an assumption that examples cannot be known before 
you know the definition, and (3) that the interlocutors offer too narrow definitions. None 
of these explains why Socrates says that there are too many things provided. Finally, the 
author argues that the answers are rejected because Socrates assumes there is only one 
explanation for why F things are F. 
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“Nimekirjad “Menonis” ja “Euthyphronis”” 
Mark Hallap 
Resümee 
 
Platoni “sokraatilistes” dialoogides “Menonis” ja “Euthyphronis” kukuvad läbi kõik 
Sokratese vestluskaaslaste katsed vastata Sokratese “Mis on F?” küsimusele. Osad 
vastused kukuvad aga läbi omapärasel moel. Euthyphroni esimene ning Menoni esimene 
ja kolmas vastus nimetavad “liiga palju” kandidaate. Antud töö vaatab mitut 
konkureerivat tõlgendust. Järgnevad tõlgendused lükkab autor tagasi: 1) Sokratese 
vestluskaaslased annavad vastuseks partikulaari, mitte universaali; 2) Sokrates eeldab, et 
näiteid ei saa teada enne definitsiooni; 3) vestluskaaslaste vastused on liiga kitsad. Ükski 
neist vastusevariantidest ei seleta, miks Sokrates leiab, et vestluskaaslased nimetavad 
“liiga palju” asju. Autor väidab, et vastused lükatakse kõrvale põhjusel, et Sokrates eeldab, 
et on ainult üks seletus, miks F asjad on F. 
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